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A

t

the Naval War College's 2006 Global Legal Challenges conference, I sat as a

member of the Public Perceptions Under the Law panel. The panel was
charged with the following questions:
1. How does the media shape public perceptions of the law? Does the media
generally shape such public perceptions in an accurate way? Does the
media understand the law well enough to accurately in form the public of
legal issues-and the related law-surrounding such issues? Does the
media have an obligation to understand-and then provide an accurate
recitation/analysis of-such law? Is there any responsibility on the part
of the government to "educate" the media concerning legal issues and

the law?
2. Do public perceptions of the law ever serve to help shape national policy
decisions? Should policy makers be attuned to the public's perception of
the law affecting a particular legal issue? Or, can policy makers effect
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decisions on the basis that the "national interests" concerns of the
American populace will often outweigh its concern as to whether certain
US actions are--or are not-lawful?
3. Is the general public generally well or ill informed on legal issues? Should
the government play an active role in "educating" the public on such
issues through the media? For example, should the government act to
correct an incorrect media analysis of the law affecting a current event?
Does the government itself have a responsibility to accurately reflect the
law? That is, to what extent should the government advocate a particular
analysis of a legal issue when there are dearly differing views of the
applicable law? Is the American public's view ofJrespect for the law affected
by its perception of its elected representatives' "respect" for such law?
4. What role do other "players" in the international community play in
shaping the public's view of the law, that is, the Arab, the Israeli, the
British, the Chinese, the Russian and Korean street? How?
5. What role should academia play in "educating" the public on the law?
Should academia see itself as a counterweight to any governmental
attempt to "shape" the public's perception of the law? Is this a
productive--or divisive-role that academia might play?
My article answers these provocative questions in four parts: The Media-Profession or Business?; Government and Media: Public Law Diplomacy-Facts and
Fictions; The International Community and the Public: The Image Struggle; and
The Academic Community-The Proper Role? My goal is to provide perspective
on the issues and raise some provocative points for future discussion and analysis.

The Media-Profession or Business?
The media is a critical shaper of public opinion about the law. But the definition of
media has evolved. In the modern era we have become inundated with law and media from general press publications, specialized press publications, general television shows, Court TV, movie documentaries, "mockumentaries," Hollywood
movies, fiction thrillers, news magazine shows (e.g., Front/ine), websites and, the
newest, the blogosphere. Since legal opinions on complicated subjects can easily be
50 to 100 pages in length, the logic of legal opinions are hard to summarize for the
general public. In the end, the final result of some cases is dear-guilty or not
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guilty, constitutional or not constitutional. Many other cases, however, are much
more subtle and deal with the nuances of congressional fact-finding and the deference owed to judicial review. These cases construe the inner workings of separation
of power, federalism and/or political power. Easy and facile summaries usually distort the meanings. Increasingly fact and fiction, entertainment and education
merge, and the lines between advocacy and information blend and blur.
In many cases involving the Supreme Court, there may be vigorous dissents and
multiple concurrences in the majority. Sorting out the holding or the center of
gravity of the logic of the analysis can be challenging. Television commentators are
usually given two or three minutes to explain the case. Print media has more space,
but, unless the case addresses a "high-profile" issue, there is immediate coverage
the day the opinion is handed down, and then little follow up editorial discussion.
Perhaps the Sunday papers will have a more in-depth analysis or the Sunday talk
shows will take up the issue. Although law reviews remain the serious vehicle for
the legal academic community, their style and fo rmat condemn them to the
rarified communities oflaw students and professors.
Occasionally a "news magazine show," e.g., 60 Minutes, will do an extended 20minute segment. These shows will help shape the "general" sense of the meaning of
the case or issue. Increasingly, websites and blog pages have become, by default, the
place of extended commentary, analysis and focus. But this, in the end, is a limited
conversation among a select group of the "legal elite chattering class."
What is the media's obligation or responsibility? To my mind, this is a tricky
question. As a first proposition, and at the risk of being overly controversial, let us
conceive of the media as a business, not a profession . Reporters, journalists and
producers wo rk for corporations that need to sell their products. Print media is
under severe attack by the new emerging technologies. Print reporters for national
papers, magazines, blogs and journals have gained personal reputations and followings. Some media or commentators claim to be "neutral" in their reporting
and analysis; others clearly reflect a bias or viewpoint and write with a "spin," e.g.,
"Activist liberal judges are rewriting the Constitution and should be impeached."
Particular commentators stand out and have become "opinion makers." Their assessments carry weight, and often in conversation one notes the dialogue: "Did you
see X's (column, commentary or blog)? Do you agree?" Their influence turns on
a number of factors--quality of analysis, accuracy in reporting, position in the
media, insightfulness and clever commentary. The marketplace determines their influence; some markets prefer reinforcement, others accuracy and some satire, e.g.,

The Daily S}'OW.
Rather than a "profession," however, the media are more akin to skilled artisans, writers and performers commenting on the law and legal events, giving
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perspectives and views. Although there is some distinction between the "op-ed"
section and "news" sections of the media, increasingly the market place is eroding
what once was an arguable separation. The obligation of the media is to "inform. »
There is no constitutional or statutory requirement for "accuracy or analysis." Reporters are not sanctioned or regulated by the State and are not disbarred from the
profession-no one can arrest them for practicing without a license. In fact, the
First Amendment protects the media/press function from the preying regulatory
interests of Congress:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of spee(:h, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.

Both rumor and fact are protected by the speech and press clauses. Lawyers and
doctors have no such protection-imagine if they did? Albeit there are libel suits,
but for public figures the bar is high. The concept of "if it bleeds, it lead s" is alive
and well in the United States. Moreover, US news and commentary crowds out
news from other parts of the world.
War correspondents have a particular challenge. Reporting the truth may damage the war effort. Revealing military mistakes undermines confidence in the overall ability of US forces. Yet once embedded with the troops, the identification with
the effort and the fact that the troops are protecting the reporter has to have an effect. Giving the "'soda straw" perspective is powerful, immediate and visceral, but is
it relevant to the grand campaign? Finally, a hard professional question for the US
media is the following hypothetical. Imagine a situation whereby Osama bin Laden
contacts a US reporter and offers an exclusive in terview to tell his side of the story
in a third coun try location-not in the United States o r in Iraq. Would a US reporter contact the military to tell of the offer? Would the US reporter agree to have
a "global positioning" chip embedded in or on his person? Would a foreign journalist, offered the same opportunity, make the same choices as the US journalist?
Are US reporters reporters, US nationals or professionals?

Government and Media: Public Law Diplomacy--Facts and Fictions
Faced with a media that is a business and a First Amendment that protects the informing function, broadly defined, how should a government respond? What is
the government's role in the public perception of the law? Should the government
play an active role in "educating" the public on such issues through the media? For

180

Harvey Rishikof
example, should the government act to correct an incorrect media analysis of the
law affecting a current event? What is the appropriate role for the government in
responding to the shaping of the legal m essage for the public?
First, the concept of government must be defined. Our governm ent is composed of the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Historically, the federaljudicial branch has not involved itself in public information or public diplomacy
campaigns. State judges, some of whom compete for public office, have been more
"active" in explaining themselves during election periods. US federal judges, however, have been unique in the restraint they have shown as controversy mounts
about the role of federal judges or the interpretation of an opinion. Although
judges have written books, articles and law reviews, they rarely consent to be interviewed and refuse to comment on current cases. Often is heard the refrain, "The
case speaks for itself." This is not true in all legal jurisdictions. In Canada, for example, the Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice will hold press conferences to
explain the meaning of a case recently handed down. This would be unprecedented
in the US federal system.
Judicial independence is protected by bar associations, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks and law schools speaking on behalf of the judiciary. In fact,
attacking judges' independence has been a recurring historical phenomenon in the
United States and public opinion heretofore has been mobilized to prevent other
parts of the government from disciplining the courts. The defeat of the proposed
Franklin Delano Roosevelt "court packing" plan in the 1930s resulted in even more
independence being granted to the judiciary.l Prior to the fai led plan, the judiciary
submitted its budget through the Department of Justice and the Attorney General
of the United States. Once the plan was defeated, Congress passed legislation so
that the judiciary submits its budget independently and directly to Congress
through the Office of Management and Budget.
This leaves the executive and the legislative branches. It is often the case that the
government is divided, with one party controlling the presidency and the other
controlling one or both houses. The legislature, with its power to hold public hearings, can address judicial opinions directly with extensive deliberations. Scores of
witnesses--experts, pundits and academics---<an be called to testify even under
oath and render their opinions about critical legal issues. A legislative record is created, and these proceedings are covered by the media and commentated upon. Virtual media frenzies can be created with daily interviews, stories and gavel-to-gavel
coverage of high-interest committee hearings.
Senators and members of the House of Representatives have enormous power
to shape the public debate through this process. The legislature can fill the public
space with interviews, studies and research papers and conduct behind-the-scenes
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lobbying and negotiating with the executive branch. In fact, members of the executive branch can be subpoenaed and forced to testify about events, positions and
views. Although the President can invoke executive privilege, the Congress, public
and media carefully scrutinize such tactics.
The executive has an enormous array of tools at its disposal to "spin" legal issues
and positions taken by the President . It is now a well-established Sunday morning
ritual to have the President's men and women fan out across the talk shows with
the same song sheet and present the White House position. The President's press
conferences and ability to address the nation from the Oval Office, to "go directly"
to the people over the heads of the media, is a powerful tool to influence the debate
on legal policy issues. Pronouncements on legal issues by the President carry significant weight since it is assumed the leading legal minds of the administration have
researched those issues and support the positions being taken.
Recently the prosecution of "leaks" of even high-ranking government officials
and the subpoenaing of reporters by US attorneys for the identity of sources have
demonstrated a new weapon by the executive to control the flow of information.
The revelation by syndicated columnist Robert Novak of Valerie Plame Wilson as
an undercover CIA officer, and the subsequent investigation by the US Attorney
for the Northern District of lIIinois, Patrick]. Fitzgerald, involving I. Lewis
"Scooter" Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney's former chief of staff and national
security adviser, and the holding of Judith Miller of the New York Times for contempt in not revealing her source is clear evidence of the executive's power to shape
the terrain for the flow of information.
Moreover, the prosecution of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's
(AlPAC) director of foreign policy, Steve Rosen, and an Iran specialist, Keith
Weissman, in addition to Lawrence Franklin, an Iran analyst at the Department of
Defense (DoD), will be the first time the fede ral government has charged two private citizens with leaking State secrets. According to the indictment, Rosen and
Weissman repeatedly sought and received sensitive information, both classified
and unclassified, and then passed it on to others in order to advance their policy
agenda. In the case, it is alleged that Rosen and Weissman received the information
from a DoD official, Franklin, who wanted the information passed on to other officials. For some legal experts, the prosecution threatens political and press freedom
by making the fl ow of information and ideas a crime. Federal prosecutors are using
the Espionage Act for the firs t time against Americans who are not government officials, do not have security clearances and, by all indications, are not a part of a foreign spy operation. The prose<.:Ution of the strategic leak whereby one part of the
executive charges another part of the executive raises the question of who is using
whom in the process of shaping opinion.
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The press and the legal communities are carefully watching these cases to see
how the courts will strike the balance between leaks, information flo w, national security, the First Amendment and the right to know. The resolution will help shape
the debate for the future.

The International Community and the Public: The Image Struggle
What role do other "players" in the international community have in shaping the
public's view of the law-that is, the Arab, the Israeli, the British, the Chinese, the
Russian and Korean street? The issue of the public is best understood in the context
of public diplomacy to include the several publics involved, for example, in the
War on Terrorism (US, European, Afghani, Iraqi, other Middle Eastern). Since 9/
11, the US public's approval rating for the Iraqi confli ct has steadily trended downward from 90% to about 40%. The world media are central to shaping public perceptions, but the expectation that the media will simply be "fair" is misplaced. How
much the US public is affected by foreign press is unclear. AI Jazeera loops pictures
of noncombatant Palestinians being killed by Israeli forces and then cuts to US
forces in Iraq and noncombatant Iraqi corpses. The number of Iraqi dead is still
not fully reported in the US media, but the world community opposed to the war
focuses on the civilian casualties. The world media approaches the subject with its
own views and that is the way it is and should be.
Covering the war by leaving Baghdad's Green Zone is a dangerous en terprise.
According to Reporters Without Borders, the war in Iraq has proved to be the deadliest for journalists since World War II. As of November 2006, a total of 135 journalists and media assistants have been killed in Iraq since the war began on March
20,2003. This is more than the number killed during 20 years of war in Vietnam or
the civil war in Algeria. Iraq is also one of the world's biggest marketplaces for hostages, with 38 journalists kidnapped in three years. Five of them were executed.
Three are still being held by their abductors. Around 63 journalists were killed in
Vietnam during the 20 years from 1955 to 1975. A total of 49 media professionals
were killed in the course of their work during the war in the former Yugoslavia
from 1991 to 1995. During the civil war in Algeria from 1993 to 1996,77 journalists
and media assistants were killed. 2
One can have only admiration and deep respect for those reporters and commentators willing to sacrifice their lives to tell the story of Iraq. Informing the public accurately on legal issues emanating from the conflict is even more problematic,
especially given the growing gap between US and European views on relevant internationallaw questions. The gap is largely a topic of conversation among elites,
however, and the participation of the media and the public is not central. T he 2006
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US election demonstrates, however, that the status of the war affected the American people and coverage and commentary was critical.
But there are critical cultural differences between the United States and the
world. Europe, for example, believes that the death penalty is a violation ofhwnan
rights while the United States and the Supreme Court hold that the death penalty is
part of US culture and heritage. In this sense, "soft power," as understood by Joseph Nye,3 is not effective if the message runs counter to world opinion.
Legal commentators are a new, vibrant phenomenon; they and other shapers of
public perceptions are delivering information very rapidly and in ever-new ways
technologically. Commentators on the blogosphere now have tremendous power,
as do the dominant images that ultimately become adopted as emblems of a conflict in the public consciousness. Which picture will be the iconic emblem of the
war-the statue of Saddam Hussein coming down? Or the hooded detainee from
Abu Ghraib? Or the pictures of the long lines of a free and democratic Iraq voting?
For Vietnam, the pictures of Saigon police chief Nguyen Ngoc Loan's raised pistol to the temple of a suspect and of the young girl, Kim Phuc, who ran naked from
the napalm attack on her village became the public's images of the war frozen in the
minds of the US population.
These pictures of Vietnam captured what appeared to be violations of international law, and became metaphors, right or wrong, for the war. Reality may be very
different from the image or perception. Recently, Dominic Johnson and Dominic
Tierney have argued that theTet offensive of Jan uary 1968 was actually an unmitigated disaster for the communists (no targets were held and approximately 40,000
Vietcong were killed), but the attack was viewed as a defeat fo r the United States
due to the previous overblown expectations of public opinion that victory was near
fo llowing President Johnson's expansive rhetoric before the offensive, the fact the
US embassy was placed under direct fire, and the way the media portrayed the offensive and the Vietcong resurgence. 4 The fog of battle can cloud press coverage
and portrayal. As has often been noted, truth is the first casualty of war. Perception
is critical. When the stakes are high, however, and pictures and facts of casualties
contradict the government's portrayal of reality, the public's mood can swing dramatically, particularly in election season.

The Academic Community-The Proper Role?
What role should academia play in educating the public on the law? Should academia see itself as a counterweight to any governmental attempt to shape the public's perception of the law? Is this a productive--or divisive-role that academia
might play?
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The academic role in educating the public is often equivocal: the academic
search for long-term truths and guiding principles does not often yield information that readily impacts public perceptions. Increasingly, academics are flooding
the airwaves, blogs and documentaries, and giving on-the-spot commentary. The
O.J. Simpson trial began a trend that has continued in force. From the perspective
of John Stuart Mill, this is all good-the more speech in a democracy the better. Let
the marketplace of ideas sort out the cacophony of voices. O ften the same "usual
suspects" show up for the pithy quote in the article by the well-known journalist or
commentator. (I must confess to pleading guilty on this charge.) Other academics
have chosen to start their own blogs where they keep a running commentary on the
legal issues that fall undertheir expertise. It is only a question oftime before the Supreme Court cites a blog as a source of authority for an opinion.
Independence and tenure give academia a special voice in the legal debates.
When the legal community uniformly disagrees with the government's position, it
has an impact on the public's sense of propriety. How much impact is unclear.
Moreover, the most significant question is what effect the community has on the
court deciding the issues. Are judges or justices swayed by amicus briefs from respected members of the legal community overwhelmingly agreeing on a position?
More often than not, the community will be divided, with respected voices on both
sides of the "vs." The judge's own independence is the final arbiter, not the academic community. The academic community acts more like a searchlight illuminating the different paths. The court must choose the route, and then be held
responsible.

ConciU5ion
So where does this leave the debate of national security, media and the government? Piercing the fog of confusion is never an easy task. Essential to our democracy is open debate. Our cacophony, like our democracy, is the best approach given
the alternatives. Unlike the United Kingdom, the United States has no Official Secrets Act,S although the combination of the Title 18 provisions criminalizing fraud
and related activity in connection with computers6 and the State-secrets privilege,
tied to prosecutions under the Espionage Act,' brings such a regime closer. Faced
with such a threat, some have called for a federal shield law for reporters and Senators Richard Lugar, Arlen Specter, Christopher Dodd and Charles Schumer sponsored the Free Flow of Information Act of 2006. 8
Until such time when such a United Kingdom approach takes hold, our system
remains one of no prior restraints, few media regulations (e.g., the Federal Communication Commission), private law suits for defamation, a private multi-faceted
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media, an independent legal system, unregulated new worldwide technologies of
communication, a ship of State that "leaks" from the top and a literate audience.
True, it is an audience more interested in Monday Night Football, Judge Judy, The
Daily SIIOW, and Dancing with the Stars, but it is an audience that has the right and
the ability to engage and become involved ifi t so chooses. We call it, in short, freedom of the press. Warts and all, the best remedy is more commentary, to paraphrase lohn Stuart Mill.
No tes
I. FDR allegedly presented the Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937 to relieve the workload of elderly judges. The bill would have allowed FDR to appoint one judge for each sitting
judge over age 70 and six months with at least ten years of experience. FDRcouid have appointed
six more Supreme Court justices immediately, increasing the size of the court to 15 members. A
Congress dominated by Democrats would have been expected to appoint judges friendly to FDR
and his New Deal agenda. The measure was opposed by senior leaders of the Democratic party
and defea ted. Controversy still surrounds the reason why Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts
changed his vote. p rior to the bill's defeat in Congress, on a minimum wage law. but his vote became known as "the switch in time that saved nine.»
2. This information is compiled from the Reporters Without Borders websi te. See http://
www.rsf.orglspet:iaLiraq...en.php3 and http://www.rsf.orglarticle.php3?id_article=16793 (both
last visited Dec. 27. 2(06). The numbers of journalists and media killed in Iraq are continually
increasing. For example. by December that figure had risen from 135 in November to 139.
3. See, e.g., JOSFPH S. Ny£, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS
(2004).
4. See Dominic Johnson & Dominic Tierney, The Wars of Perception, NEW YORK T1M FS,
Nov. 28, 2006, at A23.
5. Official5ecrets Act, 1989.
6. 18 US Code sec. 1030 (2000) .
7. Public Law No. 65-24, 40 Statutes at Large 217 (I917).
8. S. 2831, 109th Congress (2006) .
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The Military and the Media in Perspective:
Finding the Necessary Balance

James P. Terry*

I

n reviewing the recent events in Iraq and the War on Terrorism vis-a.-vis the
media, the one obvious question asked by all Americans today, including those
in military service, is who do the media represent. Do they represent the voice of
the American people, or do they represent a defined elite concerned with a change
in the political landscape in the United States?

Recent Background to Current Contentiousness
Two recent incidents, I believe, are indicative of the current unease between the
military and the media and force us to reflect on who and what the media represents in their reporting on military activities. In early 2005, Newsweek, owned by
the Washington Post Company, published a story by Michael Ishikoff claiming
that a copy of the Koran had been flushed down a toilet by an American interrogator at Guantanamo, Cuba, in front of Muslim intelViewees. When evidence was
produced that showed it to be false. Newsweek belatedly retracted the story but only
after much damage to the US m ilitary's image occurred in those countries with
whom we must cooperate in the War on Terrorism.l More importantly, the rioting
that fo llowed resulted in 16 deaths in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Newsweek,
.. Colonel, Uni ted States Marine Corps (ReL).
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moreover, wanted no part of the White House's request that it help repair the damage. And, unfortunately, no journalist from any major news organization wrote
that they should.
The current reporting of the Haditha story also bears mentioning. The rush to
judgment of the Marines involved by the US media without waiting until the facts
are determined has been viewed by many as simply reflective of the media's tendency to believe the worst. More significantly, the fact that the incident was reported immediately to superiors by the Marines involved, that those in command
were made aware of the civilian deaths contemporaneous with the incident, and
that the squad involved has consistently claimed that they followed their rules of
engagement in clearing the buildings from which they took fire, have all been conveniently overlooked by the mainstream media in their reporting. More importantly, there has been no investigative reporting on standard procedures for
clearing buildings from which fire is taken and no interest in reporting the context
in which these deaths occurred.
What is most difficult to understand is why the press, most of whom have not
served in the military, so often chooses to believe fo reign sources proven incorrect
in the past, and disregard the voices of fellow Americans who are daily placing
themselves in harm's way fo r our nation's foreign interests. Military lawyers also
ask why the press ignores the basic legal principles that apply in irregular
belligerencies where unlawful combatants are engaged with national forces-in
this case coalition forces and forces of the new Iraqi government. We must also ask
why there is such a bent to discredit and criticize US efforts rather than understand
the rationale behind coalition actions aimed at ensuring we can "stay the course" in
Iraq and the reasons for the immediate actions in support thereof.
With that said, our charge must be to assess the relationship between the media
and the military as it relates to an understanding and articulation of the legal parameters of the current conflict in Iraq as covered by the press-that is, Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Our goal should be to increase mutual understanding at both the
personal and institutional levels of what the legal regime actually represents with
respect to the military's operational requirements in the War on Terrorism and the
legal framework under which the current conflict is being pursued. One would
hope that the effort here today can help lead to practical solutions to areas of friction
in communication between the two. Finally, our ultimate quest must be how can
we maintain a vibrant, robust freedom of expression while protecting the nation's
capacity to fight our wars effectively.
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The ugal Principles Underlying Irregular Belligerencies:
Often Ignored in the Reporting on Iraq
The Nat ure of the Current Violence
As discussed below in detail, the media's use of the now firmly ingrained term, "insurgents," or "insurgency," is both factually and legally incorrect and reflects the
media's misunderstanding of the conflict.
The Global War on Terrorism was clearly not contemplated when the four
Geneva Conventions, addressing wars between national entities, were signed in
1949. 2 The violence in Iraq currently perpetrated by al Qaeda and elements of the
former regime is being spearheaded by individuals under no known national authority, with no command structure that enforces the laws and customs of warfare,
and with no recognizable, distinguishing military insignia. More importantly, they
represent no identifiable national minority in Iraq. Their attacks have injured and
killed civilians of all ethnic groups, as well as more than 2,500 US military personnel attempting to assist the democratic government in Baghdad to succeed. Their
use of children and women as lookouts and information gatherers is reminiscent of
Vietnam and raises serious questions about the status of those individuals when
acting on behalf of terrorist fighte rs in Iraq. The fact that this status is seldom, if
ever, acknowledged by the press raises serious concerns for the military in their efforts to assure the public of our adherence to the law of war.
It is important to understand that terrorist violence provides no legal gloss for
its perpetrators. The critical international law principles applicable to the violence
in Iraq are found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions in Common Article 33 relating
to internal armed conflicts and the principles en unciated in the two Additional
Protocols to these Conventions negotiated in 1977.4 The minimal protections afforded by Common Article 3, for example, include prohibitions on inhwnane
treatment of noncombatants, including members of the armed forces who have
laid down their arms. Specifically forbidden are " murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment," and extrajudicial executions.
Provision must also be made for collecting and caring for the sick and wounded.
The 1977 Geneva Protocols had their roots in wars of national liberation following World War II. Colonial powers, to include the United States, France, Great
Britain, and the Netherlands, had engaged these liberation movements militarily,
often with little regard for the law of armed conflict. In the 1974 conference
hosted by the Swiss government in Geneva, the need to regulate conflicts of a
non-international character was addressed in Article 96(3) of Additional Protocol I
and is the subject of Additional Protocol II. At the confere nce, the Swiss
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Government invited members of national liberation organizations to participate,
but not vote.
The participation of non -State actors helped shape the drafting of Article 96,
paragraph 3 of Additional Protocol I. This section provides that a party to a conflict
with a State army can unilaterally declare it wants the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and the 1977 Protocols to apply. This would, of course, offer greater protection for
members of n ational liberation movements. Under Article 96, however, parties
authorized to make such a declaration had to establish that they were involved
in "armed con flicts in which people are fighting against colonial do mination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of
self-determination."5 In Iraq, however, terrorists are trying to unseat the government that has been overwhelmingly approved by the people. Moreover, al Qaeda
has made no statement that it desires the Geneva Conventions to apply.
These terrorists, or unlawful combatants, however described, have no juridical
existence other than as common criminals. Additional Protocol I, Article I confli cts, or those between a nation and a recognized insurgency seeking a legal status,
differ from the present terrorist violence in that participants in Article I conflicts
opposing government forces are required to meet certain minimum requirements.
These are: ( I) that they operate under responsible command and are subject to internal military discipline; (2) that they carry their arms openly; and (3) that they
otherwise distinguish themselves clearly from the civilian population.6 In return
they are accorded certain protections when captured. It is doubtful that those perpetuating violence in Iraq today meet these criteria for the status of insurgent.
Moreover, they are exploiting every ethnic group fo r their own vicious ends, without regard for these requirements.
The fact that these terrorists have no recognized and protected status under the
Geneva Conventions or their Protocols, and employ methods completely banned
by the laws of armed conflict, is likewise seldom articulated by mainstream reporters. In addition, al Qaeda's failure to adhere to the most basic tenets of internationallaw on the battlefield is never addressed. What is addressed is every claimed
violation of the law by American service members, often responding to acts of savagery by Muslim extremists claiming to act on behalf of Allah, not on behalf of a
national or sub-national entity. The fact that these claimed violations of the law of
war by Americans are often subsequently found to be without substance seems to
never appear in print.
The Status of the AI Qaeda and Other Anti-Government Participants
While the press today insists on calling these terrorists " insurgents," the fact that
they are the basest of criminals, and not insurgents with minimal juridical status
190

James P. Terry
under Article I, Protocol I, as discussed above, is never recited. The fact that they do
not represent even a significant minority of the Sunnis, Shiites or Kurds is never explained. (We know this because 70% from all sectors voted in the December 2005
elections for a democratic government.) And there is never a call in the press for the
Iraqi people to stand up and denounce these perpetrators of violence who are even
now sucking the lifeblood from the fledgling Iraqi Government .
The law of armed conflict is based largely on the distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Unfortunately, in Iraq, the clear distinction normally
witnessed in conflict (i.e., belligerents on the one hand and the civilian populace on
the other) is significantly blurred. Nor are all elements that are perpetuating the violence today working toward the same ends. Baathist operatives within the Sunni
elite who were formerly within Saddam's inner circle are trying to prevent the
fledgling democracy from succeeding. The al Qaeda leadership is focused on driving the Western influences from Iraq and it is likewise targeting any supporters of
the current coalition effort to help the new Iraqi government sustain democracy.
Certain members of the Shiite leadership have used the turmoil as an opportunity
to settle scores while at the same time refusing to commit completely to the new regime until it is determined that it can succeed. Shiite religious leaders like Sistani
are remaining silent. The Kurds have opted to remain on the sidelines in the north
and take a wait and see approach while at the same time ostensibly supporting the
new regime. Then there are the local rivalries, and in Iraq, all politics are local. I saw
that in Fallujah in late 2004 and in early 2005 when I was there on behalf of the Secretary of State.
The point is that the Marines under scrutiny at Haditha responded to attack in a
very complex environment. The key question had to be whether they followed the
legally scrubbed rules of engagement and, equally important, whether the ruJes of
engagement followed, if in fact they were followed, actually applied to the facts on
the ground as they presented themselves to the Marines involved. Major General
Bargewell, the investigating officer, is now carefully examining these questions on
behalf of the Secretary of Defense.
These cross currents, and the fact that our Marines and Army forces are dealing
with a period of carefuJly orchestrated violence, need to be more accurately portrayed by the media. The fact that individuals, including women and children, who
participate actively and directly in support of combat activities (such as providing
combat intelligence, physically shielding combatants, etc.) themselves become
combatants and are legitimate targets of attack, needs to be explained. That is why
it is so critical that reporting on events such as the Haditha killings receive careful
review and carefuJ attention.
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Finding the Appropriate Military-Media Relationship
We must ask then, what is the appropriate balance in reporting in the current
struggle in Iraq? How can the media report events in a more accurate way? What
can the military do to provide the legal insights necessary for the media to fully understand the operational legal issues that have and will arise? There is no question
that public perceptions of the law and, more specifically, perceived violations of the
law shape national policy decisions. This was never more true than in Vietnam,
where the My Lai murders helped to sour the Vietnamese public on our continued
presence there, and the US public on our continued participation in that conflict.
In the present conllict in Iraq, the allegations concerning the alleged murders at
Haditha and other similar incidents are even now shaping national policy decisions. It was no accident that when President Bush visited Baghdad on June 13,
2006 he met with the new Iraqi Prime Minister and expressed support for continued US presence on the one hand, while urging the Iraqis to move quickly to train
their own forces and to take the lead in their own defense.
There is also no question that the climate under which the military and the media operate has intensified since September 11,2001. A 2005 Gallup Poll found that
large majorities of both the military respondents and the public believe that news
stories about the military tend to be too negative. 7 Members of all three groups,
military, media and the public, however, believe that embedding the media within
the operational forces enhances the public's understanding of the war, helps the
morale of the troops, improves the public's perception of the military and improves the credibility of the media coverage. It is the understanding which flows
from embedding, not mere information, which makes the difference between fair
coverage and something less.
The Pradical Effects of Embedding
It was during the Bosnian peacekeeping operation in 1995 that reporters were first
authorized and assigned to accompany US forces as part of an authorized comprehensive program. This was short-lived, however, as a sensitive conversation between a commander and his men concerning racist attitudes of one of the Balkan
parties to the conflict was reported by a Wall Street ]ounlal reporter (Tom Ricks).
The program was robustly adopted, however, by US military commanders in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The more than 600 reporters who were approved
for the program received a week-long "boot camp" of sorts aboard ship and at sites
such as Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia; Fort Dix, New Jersey; and facilities
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in Kuwait. s New York Times journalist Andrew Jacobs found it to be "alternatively
enlightening, en tertaining, horrifying, and physically exhausting."9
While nearly all reporters involved in the program during Operation Iraqi Freedom believed it gave them a greater feel for the war and a better understanding of
the military as a result of their training and experience, there were concerns by
publishers that negative stories by embedded reporters never caught the public's
atten tion. These included stories offailed supply planning, civilian casualties, fratricide and theft. I believe that this lack oftraction for negative stories can be largely
attributed to the overwhelming success of the initial campaign and the belief on the
part of most Americans that the coalition force had done a remarkable job, despite
the reported negative events.
While the embedding program was no t institutionalized during Vietnam and
earlier, one only has to recall the excellent reporting of Ernie Pyle in the Pacific during World War II to understand that the embedding of individual reporters has a
long and proud history. In Vietnam, Joe Galloway, who subsequen tly wrote We
Were Soldiers Once, with Major General Hal Moore, spent 25 years traveling "up
close and personal" with military units-primarily Marine and Army infantry
commands. It was his reporting in the Ia Drang Valley (pronounced Na Trang) in
November 1965 with an Army Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division facing overwhelming odds which catapulted him onto the world stage. Galloway described his
feelings on his reporting this way:
There, in the mud, is where war is most visible and easiest understood. There no one
will lie to you; no one will try to put a spin on the truth. Those for whom death waits
around the next bend or across the next rice paddy have no time and little taste for the
games that are played with such relish in the rear. No one ever lied to me within the
sounds of the guns. 10

The commitment by the media to embedding their reporters in Iraq has now
waned . While at one time several hundred reporters were assigned to operating
units, today that number stands at no more than 25. More than 40 media personnel, to include reporters, cameramen and assistants, have perished in attacks during the War on Terror. When a newsperson is attacked, as has happened recently in
the case of Bob Woodruff and others, the story becomes their injuries and their
prognosis and not that of the American selVicemen who may have died in selVice
to his or her nation while providing them protection . That aspect of the militarymedia relationship and the related reporting has not been ignored by the American
people.
What marked the initial success ofthe embedding process, in my view, was the
fact that the additional experience and training provided these reporters enabled
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them to turn the situation into an educational opportunity for their audience.
Through their understanding of the events in the context of the operational requirements of the conflict, they were less likely to resort to quick criticism, "gotcha" reporting and wildly negative predictions. As Navy Commander Brendon
McClane has suggested in an excellent recent article in Parameters magazine, the
next step should be to bring trusted reporters into the operations center to gain a
needed context for their stories. I I While this would have to be carefully tailored depending on the conflict and the sensitivity of the information, one can reasonably
conclude that reporters like Rick Atkinson, Major Garrett and Ted Koppel, with a
long history of trust by commanders, would be likely first candidates.
Access to the operations center would also give access to an understanding of
the rules of engagement approved for and employed by the force involved. Rules of
engagement, although highly classified, nevertheless provide the legal and operational roadmap for our military's response to attack, both geographically and with
regard to weapons systems and procedures. The understanding of these approved
operational procedures, which are trained to by our fo rces, would preclude unfounded claims of violations, because these rules are drafted after careful review of
the legal restrictions applicable and after a careful review of the combatant status of
individuals engaged. When a civilian woman or child is acting as a combatant, the
fact that the individual no longer enjoys civilian protections should be understood
by every journalist reporting the story, even if that fact is personally distasteful.
When a civilian family is harboring a terrorist in their house who is firing on US
troops serving in Iraq and representing the interests of the democratically elected
government, as is alleged to have happened at Haditha, the reporters need to know
that the home is no longer a protected place but has become a safe haven for the enemy. These are the basics, but they often seem not to be within the lexicon used by
the fourth estate.
When we have reporters who understand the law, have good judgment and have
integrity, their reporting tends to be clear, more accurate and in context. When
they do not exhibit these traits, their reporting can be misleading and worse, it
tends to frustrate the military and, as we witnessed after Vietnam, preclude an effective dialogue in future military engagements.
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